MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS ON THE PROTECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BILL, 2026 (BILL NO. 13 OF 2026)

Submitted by: Gabula Sadat Address: Kasangati Town Council Email: mrgabulas@gmail.com Telephone: +256 780 958 736 Date: 23 April 2026 Submitted to: Parliament of Uganda We are Ugandans who want a country that is sovereign and free, prosperous and just. 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 (Bill No. 13 of 2026), gazetted on 13 April 2026 and tabled in Parliament on 15 April 2026, proposes a fundamental redefinition of citizenship, criminalisation of ordinary economic activity, and concentration of unchecked power in the Minister of Internal Affairs. If enacted in its current form, it will: Redefine Ugandan citizens abroad as “foreigners” (Clause 1), enabling ministerial discretion to strip constitutional protections from millions of citizens by statutory instrument; Criminalise family remittances, humanitarian aid, and commercial transactions with penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment and fines of up to UGX 4 billion for entities; Require prior ministerial approval for foreign funding exceeding UGX 400 million per year — a threshold so low it captures ordinary commercial loans, development grants, and diaspora support; Create mandatory registration as an “agent of a foreigner” for employees of foreign-linked companies, NGOs, media houses, academic institutions, and faith-based organisations (Clauses 14–17); Establish “economic sabotage” as a criminal offence (Clause 13) for publishing information that “weakens or damages the economic system,” with no requirement of intent, no defence of truth, and no public interest defence; Require Cabinet approval for policy advocacy and activities in sectors where Government is responsible (Clauses 6–8), effectively extinguishing the constitutional right to influence government policy. This memorandum demonstrates that the Bill is duplicative (existing law already addresses legitimate concerns), unconstitutional (in conflict with Articles 1, 26, 28(12), 29, 38, and 43 of the Constitution), economically destructive (threatening USD 3.5 billion in foreign direct investment, USD 1.5 billion in tourism, and an estimated USD 1.4 billion in diaspora remittances), and without parallel in comparable international legislation. We respectfully call on the Joint Committee to: 1. Reject the Bill in its current form and return it to the Executive for fundamental redrafting; 2. Adopt the alternative framework proposed in Section 27 — a transparency-based Foreign Funding Registration Act underpinned by judicial oversight; 3. Issue an unambiguous statement that no Ugandan citizen shall ever be deemed a foreigner under any law of Uganda; 4. Convene an inclusive national dialogue within 30 days, with equal representation from government, opposition, civil society, religious bodies, and the diaspora; and 5. Publish a credible roadmap to genuine middle-income status grounded in domestic revenue mobilisation, local production, diaspora engagement, and regional integration. 2. OUR MANDATE AS UGANDANS We exercise our constitutional right under Article 38(2) of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995, to participate in the affairs of government and to make representations on proposed legislation. But we begin with a more fundamental principle: Article 1 declares that sovereignty belongs to the people of Uganda — not to the Government, not to the Executive, and certainly not to any Minister. Article 2 affirms the supremacy of the Constitution, which no ordinary legislation may override. The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026, inverts these principles. It proposes that a Minister may, by statutory instrument, strip a Ugandan citizen of their constitutional status as a member of “the people.” This is not legislation. It is constitutional overreach through ordinary bill. We are not “agents of foreigners.” We are Ugandans exercising our right to engage with the world, receive support from relatives abroad, and contribute to national development without fear of imprisonment. 3. WHAT IS AT STAKE: A BILL THAT REDEFINES CITIZENSHIP At its heart, the Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 is not merely a security measure — it is a fundamental redefinition of citizenship and belonging. The Bill’s most alarming provision is its extraordinarily broad definition of “foreigner,” which explicitly encompasses Ugandan citizens living abroad (Clause 1). Critics have described this as an attempt to strip citizens of their constitutional rights and to subvert the Constitution by ordinary legislation. Government officials have sought to reassure the public that the Bill will not strip citizens of citizenship. This reassurance misses the point. The Bill does not need to revoke citizenship to destroy its substance. By defining Ugandan citizens abroad as “foreigners” and their relatives at home as “agents of foreigners,” it subjects citizens to a parallel legal regime of registration, surveillance, prior approval, and criminal penalty that does not apply to other citizens. A citizen who must seek a Minister’s permission to receive family support is not a citizen in any meaningful sense. If enacted, millions of Ugandans in the diaspora would become legal strangers in their own homeland, with rights, privileges, and constitutional protections at risk of being stripped away by ministerial decree. 4. THE PROPOSAL: KEY PROVISIONS OF THE BILL The Bill introduces the following core mechanisms: Provision Clause Effect Definition of “foreigner” Clause 1 Includes non-citizens, Ugandan citizens residing abroad, foreign governments, companies registered outside Uganda, international organisations, and any person the Minister may declare by statutory instrument Definition of “agent of a foreigner” Clause 1 Covers any person whose activities are “directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidised” by a foreigner Mandatory registration Clauses 14–17 Every agent must register with the Ministry of Internal Affairs; certificates valid for 2 years only; subject to intrusive suitability inquiries including mental and physical health checks Foreign funding cap Clause 22 No foreign financial support exceeding UGX 400 million (~USD 106,000) per 12 months without prior written Ministerial approval; funds received without approval forfeited to the State Policy activities Clauses 6–8 Policy advocacy, influencing government policy, and activities related to policy implementation require Cabinet-level authorisation; developing policy without approval is a criminal offence Economic sabotage Clause 13 Publishing information or participating in activities that “weaken or damage the economic system or viability of Uganda” — no intent requirement, no truth defence, no public interest defence Funding disclosure Clause 21 All agents must submit public declarations of funding sources, available for inspection by any member of the public Banking restrictions Clause 25 Banks prohibited from paying out money to agents without funding source declaration and proof of Ministerial authorisation; non-compliant institutions face civil penalties of UGX 4 billion Penalties: Up to 20 years’ imprisonment; fines of up to UGX 2 billion for individuals and UGX 4 billion for entities; forfeiture of funds to the State. 5. OPERATIONAL CHANGES: A DAY IN THE LIFE UNDER THE BILL The reach of these definitions is vast. Under Clause 1, any Ugandan employee of a foreign-funded organisation, any local NGO in receipt of an international grant, any consultant engaged by a multinational, any media house with foreign advertising revenue, any church or mosque receiving diaspora remittances, any academic institution with foreign research funding, any bank with foreign capital or correspondent banking lines, any private company with a foreign shareholder or foreign-sourced loan, and any entity implementing programmes on behalf of a development finance institution qualifies as an “agent of a foreigner.” The consequences across sectors include: a) Civil Society and NGOs: The majority would be forced to shut down as their funding sources are criminalised. Those that survive would face paralysing administrative burdens — mandatory registration, public disclosure of all funding, 2-year certificate renewals, and health-based suitability inquiries. b) Private Sector: Employees of foreign-linked companies — including telecommunications providers, international hotels, and banks — could be classified as “agents of foreigners.” A Ugandan company with a foreign minority shareholder, a business operating under a foreign loan facility, or a joint venture with an international partner faces individual registration obligations and criminal exposure for its directors and staff. c) Tourism Industry: Earning approximately UGX 4.8 trillion annually (2024) and employing over 800,000 people, Uganda’s tourism sector would be decimated. Thousands working with international tour operators would be required to obtain expensive, recurring licences. Tourism revenues of approximately USD 1.5 billion per annum are at risk. d) Coffee and Gold Exports: Farmers, traders, and exporters would face additional regulatory hurdles. Banks processing trade finance would require Ministerial approval, causing contractual delays that destroy commercial relationships. e) Digital and Gig Economy: Any Ugandan earning income via YouTube, TikTok, Upwork, or other freelancing platforms could be compelled to register as an “agent of foreign interests.” Global digital marketplaces may block Ugandan users entirely to avoid compliance complexity. f) Cross-Border Trade: Informal trade in everyday goods — tomatoes, milk, eggs — within the East African Community would be newly exposed to criminal liability. The Bill directly contradicts EAC principles of regional integration and free movement of persons and capital. 6. THE HUMAN TOLL: INCONVENIENCE, DISORGANISATION, DELAYS, AND INEFFICIENCY a) For every family: Any Ugandan receiving a remittance from a relative abroad would require state permission. Non-compliance carries a sentence of up to 10 years in prison. A grandmother receiving school fees from her son in London becomes a potential criminal. b) For business: “Dual licensing complexity” would arise — a commercial bank, for example, might require simultaneous approval from both the Bank of Uganda and the proposed Sovereignty Board for a routine transaction, causing massive delays and commercial uncertainty. The Uganda Bankers’ Association has warned that the Bill creates severe risks to financial sector stability. c) For government services: Donor-supported health, education, and water programmes would be placed under direct political oversight, making them vulnerable to disruption arising from political infighting. d) General inefficiency: Vague definitions and overlapping mandates would create enforcement chaos across government agencies, paralyse the private sector, and breed systemic dysfunction. 7. SERVICE DELIVERY UNDER THREAT: HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMANITARIAN AID The Bill arrives at a critical moment. Donor funding for Uganda’s health budget declined from 49% in 2022 to 23% in 2025. Over 70% of health commodities currently rely on donor financing. a) Healthcare: HIV/AIDS treatment, maternal and child health services, and essential medicines would collapse as donor funding is capped below UGX 400 million without Ministerial approval. The forfeiture provisions (Clauses 22(3) and 23(2)) empower courts to confiscate foreign-sourced funds upon conviction without adequate safeguards, violating Article 26 of the Constitution (right to property). b) Education: Scholarships, school feeding programmes, and infrastructure projects funded by foreign grants at risk. c) Refugee programmes: Uganda hosts approximately 1.5 million refugees. The Bill would criminalise the humanitarian assistance that sustains them. d) Institutional response: Affected institutions must immediately diversify funding sources, pursue local supply chain solutions, form compliance cost-sharing consortiums, and prepare contingency plans distinguishing essential from non-essential services. 8. FREEDOM AND LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS The Bill is in direct conflict with multiple provisions of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995: Constitutional Provision How the Bill Violates It Article 1 — Sovereignty belongs to the people Replaces popular sovereignty with ministerial discretion; a Minister may declare any person a “foreigner” by statutory instrument Article 26 — Right to property Forfeiture of funds without adequate safeguards; no requirement to demonstrate tangible harm to Uganda’s interests Article 28(12) — Clarity of criminal offences “Economic sabotage,” “promoting foreign interests,” and “weakening the economic system” are undefined; Uganda’s Constitutional Court has consistently held that vague penal provisions are void Article 29 — Freedom of expression, association, and the press Broad prohibitions on policy advocacy, publication of economic information, and electoral engagement restrict constitutionally protected speech beyond what is “acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society” (Article 43) Article 38 — Right to civic participation Systematically restricts the ability of organisations and individuals to participate in and influence government policy Article 42 — Right to fair administrative action No prescribed timeline for Ministerial decisions, no deemed-approval mechanism, no independent appeal body In effect, the Bill replaces the constitutional principle that power belongs to the people with the proposition that power belongs to the Government — an outcome achieved through ordinary legislation that purports to override constitutional citizenship. The recent annulment of the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act by the Constitutional Court demonstrates that the judiciary will not tolerate legislative overreach into constitutional rights. However, constitutional challenges take two to three years, and the Government has a record of staying pronouncements of the Constitutional Court. By the time this Bill is annulled, irreparable damage will have been done. 9. WHY NOT USE AVAILABLE LAWS? Uganda already possesses a robust legal framework capable of addressing the stated concerns behind this Bill: a) The Constitution of Uganda, 1995: Defines citizenship and national sovereignty with clarity. No ordinary law may override it. b) The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act (Cap. 313): Provides a complete framework governing citizenship status and the treatment of non-citizens. c) The NGO Act, 2016: Regulates the registration and operations of non-governmental organisations, including oversight of their funding sources. d) The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2013: Already provides comprehensive instruments to identify, monitor, and prosecute suspicious financial flows through the Financial Intelligence Authority. e) The Penal Code: Contains offences capable of addressing foreign political financing. The Protection of Sovereignty Bill is duplicative, draconian, and unconstitutional. It purports to solve a problem that existing law already addresses, but does so by deploying instruments that cause disproportionate harm to ordinary citizens. 10. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: LOCAL, REGIONAL, CONTINENTAL, AND GLOBAL LAWS Jurisdiction Law / Framework Key Feature How Uganda’s Bill Compares United States FARA Transparency and disclosure for lobbying. No criminalisation of citizens; no prior government approval required. Uganda’s Bill imposes criminal penalties, prior approval, and registration — far beyond FARA United Kingdom Foreign Influence Registration Scheme Disclosure-based. No redefinition of citizens residing abroad as foreigners. Uganda’s Bill is prohibitory, not merely transparency-based Australia Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Disclosure, not prohibition. No criminal penalties for ordinary citizens receiving foreign payments. Uganda’s Bill criminalises receipt of family remittances Russia “Foreign Agents” Law The model this Bill most closely resembles. Widely condemned by human rights bodies; used to suppress civil society. The European Court of Human Rights found similar laws bore “the hallmarks of a totalitarian regime” (Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, 2022; Kobaliya and Others v. Russia, 2024). Uganda’s Bill exceeds even Russia’s law in breadth: no other comparable law treats diaspora citizens as foreigners India FCRA Imposes restrictions on NGO funding but does not classify Indian citizens residing abroad as foreigners. Uganda’s Bill goes further by redefining citizens East Africa (EAC) Regional Integration Treaties Principles of regional integration and free movement of persons and capital. This Bill directly contradicts EAC obligations African Union Agenda 2063 Calls for continental integration and citizen empowerment. The Bill achieves the opposite Uganda should follow the transparency-based model exemplified by the United States and the United Kingdom — not the repressive model adopted by Russia, which this Bill most closely resembles and in significant respects exceeds. 11. OPPORTUNITIES THAT WILL BE MISSED a) Economic growth: Foreign direct investment will flee. No investor will risk being labelled a national security threat or having capital subject to forfeiture. Uganda requires approximately USD 3.5 billion in FDI to achieve its 7% GDP growth target. b) Diaspora engagement: Rather than harnessing diaspora savings — estimated by the Bank of Uganda at approximately USD 1.4 billion annually — the Bill alienates this critical source of capital. Diaspora bonds and meaningful political participation rights would strengthen, not weaken, sovereignty. c) Global best practices: The Bill ignores proven, internationally accepted accountability models that achieve legitimate security objectives without criminalising citizens. d) Middle-income status: Uganda’s GNI per capita reached approximately USD 1,278 in 2025, surpassing the World Bank’s lower-middle-income threshold of USD 1,136. The Bill would reverse this progress by destroying the foreign investment, remittances, and aid on which the economy depends. 12. WHAT IS NOT CLEAR: VAGUENESS AND ARBITRARY POWER a) Key definitions: Terms such as “promoting foreign interests,” “economic sabotage,” and “weakening or damaging the economic system” are undefined, making it impossible for citizens and organisations to know in advance whether their conduct is lawful. This violates Article 28(12) of the Constitution. b) Enforcement mechanisms: It is unclear how the proposed enforcement body will interact with the Uganda Police Force, the Internal Security Organisation, immigration authorities, and the Financial Intelligence Authority. c) Scope of “agent of a foreigner”: Whether this designation extends to all employees of any foreign-incorporated company is not addressed. A Ugandan employee of MTN or Airtel, companies with foreign shareholding, would theoretically need to register as a foreign agent. d) Appeals and judicial review: No clear, independent judicial review process is established for ministerial designations, leaving executive discretion entirely unchecked. 13. THE PARADOX: CAN ANY UGANDAN BE REDESIGNATED A FOREIGNER? If a Ugandan citizen who resides or has resided abroad is a “foreigner” under this Bill, the logical extension is alarming: any Ugandan who has spent significant time outside the country — including senior government officials, Members of Parliament, and security personnel who have trained or studied abroad — could theoretically be designated a foreigner by a future minister under the Bill’s undefined criteria. The Bill provides no exceptions, no limiting principles, and no threshold of absence that would trigger such a designation. This is not rigorous legal drafting. It is an instrument capable of selective targeting, and it exposes a fundamental conceptual flaw at the heart of the legislation. 14. THE SPIRIT BEHIND THE LAW: POLITICAL CONTEXT The Bill emerged in the immediate aftermath of the disputed January 2026 elections. The principal opposition, led by Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi), rejected the results and relocated to the United States on 18 March 2026, from where a campaign for international sanctions was launched. The Government views this diaspora-based opposition as an existential threat. a) Post-election tensions: Approximately 2,000 opposition supporters were reportedly detained, with at least 30 deaths reported in the immediate post-election period. These figures are widely cited but await independent verification. b) The Bill as a countermeasure: The Bill’s primary function appears to be cutting off diaspora funding to the opposition, criminalising political dissent, and legally fortifying the Government against a new form of transnational political challenge. We acknowledge that no state should permit foreign governments to fund domestic political campaigns. This is a legitimate concern, and Uganda already possesses laws — including the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Penal Code — capable of addressing it. The question is not whether Uganda should protect its sovereignty, but whether this Bill is the right instrument. It is not. It is a sledgehammer where a scalpel is required. 15. OUR COLLECTIVE CONTRIBUTION: HOW HAVE WE REACHED THIS POINT? a) A culture of impunity: laws are routinely violated without consequences, encouraging further abuse. b) Silence and acquiescence: Many Ugandans remained silent as freedoms were incrementally eroded over decades. c) Weaponisation of patriotism: Any criticism of government policy is reflexively branded as unpatriotic or as foreign interference. d) A weakened opposition: Systematically suppressed over many years, the opposition has been unable to function as an effective check on executive power. e) Civic passivity: A culture has been permitted to develop in which citizenship is treated as a privilege to be granted or withdrawn, rather than an inalienable right. 16. THE TRADE COLLAPSE CYCLE: IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF LIVELIHOODS The Bill does not merely restrict funding — it would choke the entire trading economy. a) Export collapse: Banks processing trade finance for coffee or gold exporters would require Ministerial approval, causing contractual delays that destroy commercial relationships. Tourism earnings (approximately USD 1.5 billion per annum) would be decimated. b) Remittances destroyed: A diaspora relative sending USD 152 for school fees would require a government permit or risk prosecution. c) Import crisis: Collapsing foreign exchange reserves — the direct consequence of the destruction of exports and remittances — would sharply reduce import capacity. Critical imports, including crude oil (approximately 24% of Uganda’s import bill) and pharmaceuticals, could be disrupted, causing fuel shortages and medicine scarcity. d) Income collapse: Reduced export activity means fewer jobs, lower wages, and sharply reduced domestic purchasing power, deepening poverty. The Uganda Bankers’ Association has warned that the Bill creates severe risks to the economy, capable of halting the foreign direct investment Uganda requires to achieve its growth targets. 17. DIGITAL PRODUCTS AND THE GIG ECONOMY: SELLING TO THE WORLD BECOMES A CRIME A Ugandan selling digital products — software, music, e-books, or freelance services — to international customers would face the following under the Bill: a) Automatic registration as a “foreign agent” upon receipt of the first payment from abroad. b) An obligation to declare all income and personal data to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. c) Potential income seizure: the Government could compel PayPal, Stripe, or domestic banks to transfer earnings into a government-controlled account. d) Criminal penalties for non-compliance: a fine of up to UGX 2 billion or 20 years’ imprisonment for “economic sabotage.” This would destroy the Government’s own digital economy strategy and force global digital marketplaces to block Ugandan users entirely — the opposite of Uganda’s stated development objectives. 18. THE USD 1,000 REMITTANCE NIGHTMARE: A STEP-BY-STEP ILLUSTRATION The following illustrates the practical operation of the Bill in relation to a routine family remittance: Determine status: The sender (a Ugandan relative abroad) is classified as a “foreigner.” The Ugandan receiver automatically becomes an “agent of a foreigner.” Seek ministerial approval before receiving the money — with no prescribed criteria, no standard application form, and no stipulated processing timeline provided in the Bill. Banking risk: The receiving bank may refuse to process the transaction for fear of itself being classified as a “foreign agent” under Clause 25. Permanent legal exposure: Once designated an “agent,” the receiver’s status is ongoing. Any subsequent political or civic activity — attending a meeting, signing a petition — becomes a criminal offence under Clauses 6–8. Penalty for non-compliance: up to 10 years in prison. A family lifeline becomes a legal minefield. 19. EFFECT ON DONOR-SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS: WHAT MANAGEMENT CAN DO The immediate consequences would include effects on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria treatment programmes; risking of school feeding schemes; and starvation-level conditions in refugee camps. Institutional heads must act now: a) Lobby government: Commission and present rigorous economic analyses demonstrating that the Bill drives away capital and will increase poverty. b) Legal challenge: Partner with legal think tanks and bar associations to mount constitutional challenges at the earliest opportunity. c) Financial restructuring: Aggressively diversify funding through social enterprise models, local fundraising, and domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing. d) Strategic rebranding: Frame development programmes around “National Development” and “Ugandan Self-Reliance” to reduce political vulnerability. 20. THE PATH TO MIDDLE-INCOME STATUS: GAINS THAT WILL BE LOST Uganda’s GNI per capita reached approximately USD 1,278 in 2025, surpassing the World Bank’s lower-middle-income threshold of USD 1,136. The Bill would reverse this progress. At immediate risk: Source Amount Foreign Direct Investment USD 3.5 billion Tourism revenues USD 1.5 billion Remittances USD 1.4 billion Donor-supported health commodities Over 70% of supply The genuine path to middle-income status requires instead: a) Increasing domestic revenue from 14% to at least 18% of GDP. b) Investing in local manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and agro-processing. c) Leveraging diaspora bonds and granting diaspora members meaningful political participation rights. d) Full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to expand export earnings. 21. WORST-CASE CONSEQUENCES If the Bill is enacted in its current form, the following consequences are foreseeable and have been identified by credible institutions: a) Economic disruption: Balance-of-payments crisis; critical shortages of fuel and medicine; mass unemployment (estimated 1.5 million jobs at immediate risk) b) International isolation: Uganda cut off from global diplomacy, trade, and ties c) Domestic crisis: Criminalisation of millions of citizens; mass flight of skilled talent; a crisis of governmental legitimacy. d) Constitutional damage: The practical erosion of Article 1 of the Constitution — popular sovereignty superseded by unchecked government power. These are not hypothetical scenarios advanced to frighten. They are logical conclusions identified by the Uganda Law Society, the Uganda Bankers’ Association, and multiple international institutions and treaty bodies. 22. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: WHY HAS THE GOVERNMENT BROUGHT THIS LAW? We acknowledge that the Government has legitimate concerns that deserve a serious legislative response: a) Post-2026 election tensions and a genuine fear of diaspora-funded political opposition. b) Concern about foreign-backed political destabilisation (historical precedents in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine are cited by Government officials). c) Weak institutional resilience: Rather than building strong, independent institutions capable of withstanding external pressure, the Government has opted for a blanket legislative prohibition — a far less effective solution. d) Legitimate concern about foreign political financing: No state should permit foreign governments to fund domestic political campaigns. However, this Bill is vastly overbroad in its response, capturing ordinary remittances, humanitarian grants, and commercial transactions in its net. e) Consolidation of executive power: Whether or not one accepts this characterisation, the perception is widespread and must be openly addressed. 23. ACTIONABLE TERMS FOR NATIONAL UNITY 23.1 For the Governing Party (NRM) Withdraw or fundamentally amend the Bill. Release all persons detained solely for non-violent political expression. Initiate a High-Level Political Dialogue with independent facilitation (for example, an AU Panel of the Wise) within 30 days. To secure accountability, reduce corruption, and prevent violent unrest, the government must provide fair public funding and media access, protect opposition from harassment, and enforce transparent electoral laws—thereby building democratic legitimacy and long-term stability 23.2 For the Opposition (NUP and Others) Unconditionally renounce violence and any call for armed or unarmed insurrection. Suspend international sanctions advocacy as a confidence-building measure. Publicly condemn any act of violence by their supporters. Publish quarterly policy papers setting out credible alternative governance proposals. 23.3 For Civil Society Organisations Refrain from advocating any kind of intervention involving force. Serve as neutral conveners of local dialogue processes. 23.4 For Religious Bodies (Inter-Religious Council of Uganda) Act as guarantors of the national dialogue process. 23.5 For Media and Academia Agree on a voluntary “peace reporting” code of conduct. Host structured public debates on the Bill and on alternative sovereignty models. 24. COMPROMISE ON WHAT HAS PASSED — BUT NOT ON THE FUTURE We cannot change the past. The January 2026 elections have concluded. Detentions and casualties have occurred. We therefore propose: a national amnesty for non-violent political offences committed. What is non-negotiable for the future: No future law shall designate a Ugandan citizen a foreigner on grounds of residence abroad. No future criminal penalty shall attach to the receipt of a family remittance or humanitarian grant. No future minister shall possess unchecked power to designate individuals or organisations as “agents of foreigners” without prior judicial authorisation based on evidence. 25. THE CORE DEMAND: UGANDAN CITIZENS MUST NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS FOREIGNERS We call on Parliament to amend the Bill so as to state explicitly, and without qualification, that no Ugandan citizen — by reason of residence outside Uganda — shall be considered a foreigner for the purposes of this Act or any other legislation. Citizenship is inalienable. A Ugandan is a Ugandan, whether in Kampala, Nairobi, London, or New York. 26. OTHER AVAILABLE OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT ISOLATING UGANDA Genuine sovereignty in a globalised era is not built by erecting walls. It is built by developing the institutional strength and confidence to engage the world on one’s own terms. The Seven Principles annexed to this memorandum are summarised below: Sovereignty as rule-setting, not wall-building: Write clear, enforceable laws — then welcome those who respect them. Institutional resilience over isolation: Strengthen courts, anti-corruption agencies, and mechanisms for civic oversight. Reciprocity and mutual accountability: Demand equal and fair treatment in every international agreement. Selective openness: Maintain national control over critical sectors (defence, land, data infrastructure) while opening all others to international participation on transparent terms. Participation in rule-making, not merely rule-taking: Actively shape global standards at the AU, EAC, WTO, and UN. A credible exit option: Maintain alternative trade and financing channels to ensure that Uganda's values and principles remain non-negotiable Domestic legitimacy and citizen buy-in: Demonstrate to citizens the tangible benefits of international engagement. 27. CONCLUSION AND ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS We respectfully call on the Joint Committee to take the following steps: Reject the Bill in its current form and return it to the Executive for fundamental redrafting, consistent with the Constitution and Uganda’s international obligations. Issue a clear, unambiguous statement that no Ugandan citizen shall ever be deemed a foreigner under any law of Uganda. Convene an inclusive national dialogue within 30 days, with equal and meaningful representation from government, the opposition, civil society, religious bodies, and the diaspora. Publish a credible roadmap to genuine middle-income status grounded in domestic revenue mobilisation, local production, diaspora engagement, and regional integration — not isolation and criminal repression. We are not enemies of the state. We are Ugandans who want a country that is sovereign and free, prosperous and just. The Bill as drafted leads Uganda to isolation and economic harm. The path forward demands openness, strong institutions, and the courage to engage the world on Uganda’s own terms. Respectfully submitted. Gabula Sadat Kasangati Town Council Email: mrgabulas@gmail.com Telephone: +256 780 958 736 Date: 23 April 2026 ANNEX: SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN A FREE WORLD As submitted in support of Uganda’s engagement with the international community, and endorsed by the submitter of this memorandum as the framework that should guide any future legislation on foreign engagement. Sovereignty as Rule-Setting, Not Wall-Building: A sovereign state defines the rules of engagement with the outside world and enforces them with confidence, rather than attempting to seal itself off from global interaction. Uganda should write clear, enforceable laws — and then welcome all who respect them. Institutional Resilience Over Isolation: Sovereignty is expressed through the strength of independent courts, effective anti-corruption bodies, and a free and informed citizenry — not through blanket prohibitions on foreign contact. Build strong institutions; they are the true shield of sovereignty. Reciprocity and Mutual Accountability: Uganda should demand, and extend, equal treatment in all bilateral and multilateral relationships. No partner — foreign government, multilateral institution, or investor — should receive rights in Uganda that Ugandans do not enjoy reciprocally. Selective Openness: Critical sectors — national defence, land, and digital data infrastructure — should remain under national control. Other sectors could be open to international participation on transparent, publicly disclosed, and reciprocal terms. Blanket restriction on all foreign contact is not sovereignty; it is self-inflicted isolation. Participation in Rule-Making, Not Just Rule-Taking: Uganda should actively shape the rules that govern global trade, finance, and politics at the African Union, the East African Community, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations — not simply accept them as given. A seat at the table is worth more than a wall around the house. A Credible Exit Option: Genuine sovereignty requires the ability to walk away from any single trading or financing partner. Uganda should invest in diversified relationships — multiple trade partners, multiple financing sources, multiple diplomatic alliances — to maintain meaningful leverage in all negotiations. Domestic Legitimacy and Citizen Buy-In: A government is truly sovereign only when its citizens trust and support it. The best foundation for sovereignty is transparent governance, demonstrated national benefit from international engagement, and genuine accountability to the people. A government that fears its own diaspora has a legitimacy problem that no legislation can solve. I endorse these seven principles and urge Parliament to embed them in any future legislation governing Uganda’s engagement with foreign individuals, entities, or governments.